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T E MODERN PAY FOR PLAY MODEL: LAWS
T AT PROTECT STUDENT AT LETES
FUNDAMENTAL RI
T TO
COMMERCIALI E T EIR NAMES, IMA ES,
AND LIKENESSES
A STRACT
In O’Bannon v. NCAA, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California entered a permanent injunction against the
National Collegiate Athletic Association enjoining the collegiate sports
governing body from enforcing limits on student-athlete compensation
derived from the use of their name, images, and likenesses rights. The court
concluded that NCAA rules unreasonably restrained trade in violation of
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, however, neither the court nor the NCAA laid
out a framework for lawfully implementing these new economic rights to
student-athletes. Since that ruling, only one state’s legislature, California,
has attempted to pass legislation to prevent the NCAA from infringing on
student-athletes’ rights to profit from their name, image, and likeness, but
whether that effort bears fruit remains unclear. This Note analyzes the
California legislation and the O’Bannon decision in order to outline
potential strategies that state and federal legislatures may adopt to protect
student-athletes’ fundamental economic rights.
INTRODUCTION
The debate over whether student-athletes 1 should receive fairer
compensation from American universities—who reap considerable profits
from student-athletes’ full-time dedication to sports in exchange for
providing tuition-free college education—may have finally reached an
inflection point. The Black Lives Matter movement along with the
Coronavirus Disease of 2019 (known as COVID-19) has exposed gross
economic inequities many student-athletes face when they agree to
participate in collegiate sports, and demands for reform have been gaining
momentum unlike ever before.2 At the end of 2019, the total revenue among
1. In the 1950s, Walter Byers, the NCAA’s first executive director, was credited with
creation of the term “student-athlete,” a term intended to help the NCAA fight against workers’
compensation claims for injured football players. The NCAA is the overarching governing body
of all-American collegiate sports. Byers later claimed in court testimony in the 1990s that “[t]he
student-athlete was a term used to try to offset these tendencies for state agencies or other
governmental departments to consider a grant-in-aid holder” to be an employee. However, this
term soon became ingrained in all NCAA rules and interpretations, which was highly scrutinized
because of its perceived deliberate ambiguity. See Jon Solomon, The History Behind the Debate
Over Paying NCAA Athletes, ASPEN INST. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blogposts/history-behind-debate-paying-ncaa-athletes/.
2. Anya van Wagtendonk, Covid-19 is exposing inequalities in college sports. Now athletes
are demanding change., VOX (Aug. 2, 2020, 5:30pm), https://www.vox.com/2020/8/2/21351799/
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all National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) athletic departments
was reported to be over $18.9 billion, up from $18.2 billion in 2018 and
$17.3 billion in 2017.3 History shows that as college sports became more
profitable, the NCAA worked to prevent student-athletes from realizing any
type of profit of their own in fear of the threat they presented to the
universities’ bottom lines. 4 The NCAA developed bylaws that placed
outright restrictions on student-athletes’ general compensation and licensing
of publicity rights, also referred to as name, image, and likeness rights (NIL
rights).5 Student-athletes continue to agree to these restrictions by signing
binding standard entry forms, unsupervised by counsel, that serve as a
prerequisite to participation in college sports. 6 When these restrictions
encountered judicial review, U.S. Courts deemed them lawful by finding
the NCAA’s policy of “amateurism” allowed for an exception to otherwise
well-established antitrust law.7 However, as outlined below, these policies
inherently violate antitrust law as “anti-competitive” restraints of trade.
Additionally, they undermine public policy interests derived from
capitalism principles and common law rights of publicity.
This Note primarily analyzes California statute SB 206 (Fair Pay to
Play Act or the Act), a law signed into effect by Governor Gavin Newsom
on September 30, 2019. 8 The Fair Pay to Play Act purports to protect
student-athletes seeking to profit off their NIL rights from potential
eligibility sanctions handed down by the NCAA. 9 Specifically, the Act
provides student-athletes enrolled at universities in California with semirestricted ability to profit from licensing their NIL rights, while also
protecting intercollegiate athletic associations and universities in California
from NCAA discipline should they have such student-athletes enrolled at

college-football-pac-12-coronavirus-demands; see also Michael T. Nietzel, Black Athletes Are
Leading The New College Protest Movement, FORBES (Jun. 28, 2020, 6:00am), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/michaeltnietzel/2020/06/28/black-athletes-lead-the-new-college-protestmovement/#6c4b5e3562fa.
3. Interactive Report, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/financesintercollegiate-athletics-database (last visited Oct. 14, 2020).
4. See Matthew J. Mitten & Timothy Davis, Athlete Eligibility Requirements And Legal
Protection of Sports Participation Opportunities, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 118 (2008).
5. See Greg Lush, Reclaiming Student Athletes’ Rights To Their Names, Images, And
Likenesses, Post O’Bannon v. NCAA; Analyzing NCAA Forms For Unconscionability, 24 S. CAL.
INTERDIS. L.J. 767, 768 (2015).
6. See Mitten & Davis, supra note 4, at 118.
7. See Michael Steele, O’Bannon v. NCAA: The Beginning of the End of the Amateurism
Justification for the NCAA in Antitrust Litigation, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 511, 519 (2015).
8. Uninterrupted, Gavin Newsom signs California’s ‘Fair Pay to Play Act’ with LeBron
James & Mav Carter, YOUTUBE (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7bfBgjxVg
Tw&feature=youtu.be (Governor Newsom signed into law California’s ‘Fair Pay to Play Act’
(SB206) [September 27th, 2019] on the set of HBO’s The Shop).
9. See S.B. 206, Cal. State Assemb., 2019-20 Sess. (Cal. 2019), https://leginfo.legislature.
ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB206.
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their universities.10 The Act has substantial potential to serve as a template
for other state legislatures and, in an ideal world, should form the basis for
federal legislation (it’s notable that Congress has thus far failed to seriously
consider any legislation on this subject!). And yet, while the Act has the
right ideas for what legislation in this area should look like, it leaves room
to be interpreted over-broadly or too narrowly by those who will be charged
with its enforcement.11 Consequently, this Note proposes precise language
for legislatures to adopt in a manner consistent with the Act and shows why
this model would overcome potential legal challenges. This Note does not
address what total compensation of student-athletes is nor does it attempt to
address what fair total compensation may look like; it addresses only the
illegality of restricting student-athletes from profiting from their own NIL
rights.
This Note intends to paint a picture of how American collegiate sports
arrived to its current state and what legislatures can do to remedy the
inequities that have developed as a result. Part I of this Note explores a brief
history of the NCAA, how the concepts of amateurism were born, and how
amateurism principles developed over time. Part II examines the Sherman
Antitrust Act and how it was applied in O’Bannon v. NCAA, a key case that
challenged the NCAA’s power to restrict student-athletes from profiting off
their NIL rights. Finally, Part III offers an analysis of the Fair Pay to Play
Act, how a revised version of this law should be adopted by other
legislatures, and suggests a plan to implement these fundamental economic
rights consistent with the court’s holdings in O’Bannon.
I AN O ER IEW OF T E NCAA AND T E PRINCIPLES OF
AMATEURISM
A A RIEF ISTORY OF T E NCAA
The need for a governing body in college sports first received attention
in the late 19th century when the Harvard University regatta team sought to
gain an undue advantage over its rival Yale by obtaining the services of a
coxswain12 who was not a student of the university.13 This impropriety led
to shared concerns among university administrators regarding issues like
10. See id.
11. See Huntyr Schwegman, Not compensating collegiate athletes for likeness is exploitation
— let’s change that, UNIV. DAILY KANSAN (Oct. 3, 2019), http://www.kansan.com/sports/notcompensating-collegiate-athletes-for-likeness-is-exploitation-let-s/article_27881b7e-e527-11e99c16-0ff84578d053.html.
12. A coxswain is the member of a rowing team responsible for steering, and at times, general
race plans of the crew. Molly Seuqin, The college rowing coxswain, explained, NCAA (Sept. 27,
2018),
https://www.ncaa.com/news/rowing/article/2018-09-26/college-rowing-coxswainexplained.
13. See Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s
Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 11 (2000).
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cheating, competitive fairness, and the management of expenses that laid
the foundation for the creation of an intercollegiate athletic regulatory
body.14 In 1905, President Roosevelt called a White House conference to
review and reform intercollegiate football rules after intercollegiate football
produced 18 deaths and 100 major injuries in a single season.15 Because of
that conference, student safety was added to the growing list of shared
concerns that would require regulatory solutions in collegiate sports.16 To
address these concerns, 62 colleges formed together to establish the
Intercollegiate Athletic Association (IAA) and tasked itself with developing
a set of uniform regulations for intercollegiate football.17 In 1910, the IAA
changed its name to the National Collegiate Athletic Association and
developed a requirement that all participants in its collegiate sports
programs be “amateurs.”18
The NCAA did not play a major role in governing intercollegiate
athletics until the 1920s. 19 Instead, the NCAA focused principally on
creating championship events for its collegiate sports while being run solely
by student volunteers with limited faculty oversight.20 That changed in 1929
when the Carnegie Foundation released a report acknowledging the
increasing popularity of intercollegiate athletics. 21 The report primarily
raised concerns for student-athlete welfare by criticizing an increasing
number of abuses in collegiate sports, such as over-commercialization,
cheating, academic fraud, and gambling. 22 The report concluded that
college presidents themselves could reclaim the integrity of sports by
changing the policies permitting commercialized and professionalized
athletics. 23 Yet, despite the Carnegie Foundation’s scathing review,
commercialization and popularity of intercollegiate sports continued to
grow at a rapid pace during the 1930s, further intensified by the ability of
televisions and radios to broadcast major sporting events directly into the
growing number of homes in the United States.24
Between the 1930s and 1970s, the NCAA embarked on a crusade to
improve the integrity of governance in intercollegiate athletics and to level

14.
15.
16.
17.

See id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12.
Id.
See Audrey C. Sheetz, Student-Athletes vs. NCAA: Preserving Amateurism in College
Sports Amidst the Fight for Player Compensation, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 865, 869–70 (2016).
18. Id. at 869–70.
19. See Smith, supra note 13, at 13.
20. Id. at 12.
21. See Robert Scott Lemons, Amateurism and College Athletics (Apr. 28, 2014) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Stanford University), https://economics.sites.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/
sbiybj9386/f/publications/robertlemonshonorsthesis-may2014.pdf.
22. Id. at 19.
23. See Smith, supra note 13, at 13–14.
24. Id. at 14.
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the playing field for universities in student-athlete recruitment.25 University
presidents’ involvement with their athletics programs continued to expand
in the 1980s, partly due to widespread economic hardship across many
higher education institutions at the time. 26 During this time, university
presidents made efforts to contain the costs of their athletic programs, but
then realized there would be far greater potential for reward by combining
their economic interests in the governing body27 of the NCAA.28
Later, in the 1980s and early 1990s, the NCAA was heavily criticized
for its lack of due process procedures in rule enforcement proceedings,
which led to battles over whether the NCAA would have to defend itself
from due process claims in judicial settings.29 The 1990s marked a period of
increased public focus on race and gender issues in the NCAA.30 The fact
that the governance costs of the NCAA were (and still are) covered
predominantly by student-athletes of color highlighted racial inequities that
had been continuously proliferating in intercollegiate athletics.31
By the end of 2019, the NCAA grew to be made up of 1,117 colleges
and universities, 100 athletic conferences, and 40 sports-affiliated
organizations.32 The colleges and universities are split into three divisions:
Division I, which has 351 member-institutions, Division II, which has 308
member-institutions, and Division III, which has 443 member-institutions.33
All three divisions are subject to the NCAA’s rules regarding amateurism.34
AMATEURISM
The idea of amateurism stems from the NCAA’s long maintained goal
of initiating intercollegiate athletics programs for student-athletes,
promoting athletic excellence, and encouraging participation in sports as a
recreational pursuit.35 Yet, it is difficult to identify a precise definition of
amateurism within NCAA-produced materials.36 This lack of clarity is often
25. Id.
26. Id. at 16.
27. The appeal of a governance body is the ability to centralize the interests of all university
presidents, i.e. the NCAA, and to then use those interests to make rules controlling what goes on
in college sports universally.
28. See Smith, supra note 13, at 16.
29. See id. at 17–19.
30. See id. at 20.
31. See id.
32. See WHAT IS THE NCAA?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center
/ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
33. See OUR THREE DIVISIONS, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/ncaa-101/our-three-divisions (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
34. See id.
35. See NCAA, 2019-2020 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 1 (2019), https://
web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/reports/getReport/90008.
36. The most descriptive definition in the bylaws for amateurism can be found in Bylaw 2.9.
“The Principle of Amateurism” which states: “Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an
intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the

294

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 15

examined in judicial opinions critical of amateurism as a justification for
restricting student-athlete compensation, but much of the confusion has
been attributed to inconsistent explanations offered by the NCAA.37
The initial NCAA bylaws of 1906 did not permit student-athletes to
receive any type of compensation—like money, emoluments, or financial
concessions—as consideration for inducement to play in or enter into an
athletic contest.38 This included prohibiting what is known today as athletic
scholarships. 39 It is no secret that, despite these prohibitions, such rules
were largely disregarded and the payment of star athletes became highly
prevalent as an effect of the rapid commercialization of intercollegiate
sports.40
In 1956, the NCAA enacted its first rule allowing schools to award
athletic scholarships to student-athletes, now referred to as “grant-in-aid”
scholarships.41 Grant-in-aid scholarships gave NCAA member-institutions a
way to target athletes in recruitment with promises of financial
consideration. 42 These scholarships permitted schools to cover studentathletes’ regular expenses relating to college education, including tuition,
fees, room and board, books, and incidental expenses. 43 The new
scholarship rules helped the NCAA balance notions of commercialization
and amateurism while opening the door for the NCAA to gain greater
control over its member-institutions through rule enforcement.44 However,
the allowances for these scholarships have markedly shifted over time
through amendments made to NCAA bylaws. For example, in 2013, new
amendments permitted differing levels of scholarship compensation based
on the type of sport for which a student-athlete was recruited.45
Recently, the NCAA enacted new bylaws to ease some restrictions on
compensation received outside of student-athletes’ participation in

physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics
is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and
commercial enterprises.” See id. at 3.
37. See Steele, supra note 7, at 513–14; see also In re NCAA Ath. Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1070 (2019) (Judge Wilkens criticizes the NCAA’s definition of
amateurism in a recent opinion: “Defendants nowhere define the nature of the amateurism they
claim consumers insist upon. Defendants offer no stand-alone definition of amateurism either in
the NCAA rules or in argument.”).
38. See Steele, supra note 7 at 513–14.
39. See id.
40. See Smith, supra note 13, at 11, n. 7; see also Dylan Lathrop, Meet The Bag Man: 10
Rules For Paying College Football Players, BANNER SOC’Y, https://www.bannersociety.com
/2014/4/10/20703758/bag-man-paying-college-football-players (last visited Nov. 22, 2019).
41. See Steele, supra note 7 at 514; See also Sheetz, supra note 14, at 870.
42. See Sheetz, supra note 17, at 870.
43. See Steele, supra note 7, at 514.
44. See Sheetz, supra note 17, at 870.
45. See Steele, supra note 7, at 515.

2020]

The Modern Pay for Play Model

295

collegiate sports, but heavy restrictions still remain.46 These bylaws include
permissions to accept compensation for participation in a competition while
not representing a member-institution, but the compensation may not
include cash or cash equivalents that exceed the actual value of necessary
expenses to participate. 47 There are also new rules describing studentathletes’ involvements with professional teams.48 As part of those bylaws,
the NCAA restricts prospective student-athletes from participation in
collegiate sports if they sign a contract to play for a professional team,49
even if the contract takes effect after completion of their collegiate career.50
An exception is made for potential student-athletes before full-time
collegiate enrollment, unless they are men’s ice hockey or skiing
participants.51
It is readily apparent that the NCAA does not want student-athletes to
earn any type of net income (or be cash positive at all) from their
participation in collegiate sports as a student-athlete. 52 Previously, the
NCAA required student-athletes in Division I to sign a waiver releasing
their commercial right to license their [student-athlete] NIL rights in
perpetuity. 53 In 2014, the NCAA eliminated the in perpetuity name-andlikeness release from its Division I forms, however, this had no effective
benefit while student-athletes remained enrolled.54

46. See NCAA, 2019-2020 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 1, 234 (2019),
https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/reports/getReport/90008.
47. Bylaw 16.1.1.1. “Awards Received for Participation While not Representing the
Institution” states: “Awards received by an individual for participation in competition while not
representing the institution shall conform to the rules of the amateur sports organization that
governs the competition, but may not include cash (or cash equivalents) that exceeds actual and
necessary expenses (see Bylaw 12.1.2.4).” Id. at 234.
48. See generally id. at 68–71.
49. Bylaw 12.2.5. “Contracts and Compensation” states: “An individual shall be ineligible for
participation in an intercollegiate sport if he or she has entered into any kind of agreement to
compete in professional athletics, either orally or in writing, regardless of the legal enforceability
of that agreement.” (Revised: 1/10/92). Id.
50. Bylaw 12.2.5.2 “Nonbinding Agreement” states: “An individual who signs a contract or
commitment that does not become binding until the professional organization’s representative or
agent also signs the document is ineligible, even if the contract remains unsigned by the other
parties until after the student-athlete’s eligibility is exhausted.” Id.
51. Bylaw 12.2.5.1 “Before Initial Full-Time Collegiate Enrollment—Sports Other Than
Men’s Ice Hockey and Skiing” states: “In sports other than men’s ice hockey and skiing, before
initial full-time collegiate enrollment, an individual may enter into an agreement to compete on a
professional team (per Bylaw 12.02.12), provided the agreement does not guarantee or promise
payment (at any time) in excess of actual and necessary expenses to participate on the team.”
(Adopted:4/29/10 effective 8/1/10 applicable to student-athletes who initially enroll full time in a
collegiate institution on or after 8/1/10). Id.
52. See generally id.
53. See Sheetz, supra note 17, at 873.
54. See Marc Edelman, Removing The NCAA Name-And-Likeness Release Is Just ‘Smoke And
Mirrors’ In The Fight For College Athlete Rights, FORBES (Jul. 25, 2014, 9:51am),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014/07/25/ncaa-name-and-likeness-release-is-justsmoke-and-mirrors/#1899b9443b82.
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The NCAA continues to maintain its power over NIL rights through
bylaws that describe situations of non-permissible use of a student-athletes’
NIL rights. 55 An NCAA member-institution that does not take action
against a student-athlete found to be in violation of NCAA bylaws can be
penalized with loss of scholarships, team eligibility in postseason activities,
and monetary fines.56 In sum, these bylaws enable the NCAA to prevent
student-athletes from selling their NIL rights to third parties while creating
harsh penalties for member-institutions should they decline to report
infractions.57
II ANTI TRUST LAW AND ITS APPLICATION IN O’BANNON
A T E S ERMAN ANTITRUST ACT
Over a century ago, the federal government enacted the Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act) in order to outlaw monopolistic
business practices. 58 The Sherman Act initially authorized the federal
government to institute proceedings against massive trusts as a mechanism
to dissolve them;59 these trusts were arrangements by which stockholders in
several companies transferred their shares to a single set of trustees,
allowing the newly formed trust to dominate major industries and destroy
competition. 60 The Sherman Act’s objective was to prohibit any
combination “in the form of trust or otherwise that was in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations.” 61 The
Sherman Act outlawed “every contract, combination, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade” and any “monopolization, attempted monopolization, or
55. Bylaw 12.5.2.1 “Advertisements and Promotions After Becoming a Student-Athlete”
states: “After becoming a student-athlete an individual shall not be eligible for participation in
intercollegiate athletics if the individual: (a) [a]ccepts any remuneration for or permits the use of
his or her name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a
commercial product or service of any kind; or (b) Receives remuneration for endorsing a
commercial product or service through the individual’s use of such product or service.” NCAA,
2019-2020 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 1, 77 (2019), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/reports
/getReport/90008; See also Edelman, supra note 54.
56. Bylaw 19.9.11 “Obligation of Institution to Take Appropriate Action” states: “If a
violation has been found that affects the eligibility of one or more student-athletes, the institution
and its conference, if any, shall be notified of the violation and the name(s) of the studentathlete(s) involved. If the institution fails to take appropriate action by declaring the studentathlete(s) ineligible, the institution shall be required to show cause to the Committee on
Infractions or Independent Resolution Panel why additional penalties should not be prescribed for
a failure to abide by the conditions and obligations of membership if it permits the studentathlete(s) to compete in intercollegiate athletics.” NCAA, 2019-2020 NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL 1, 378 (2019), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/reports/getReport/90008.
57. See Edelman, supra note 54.
58. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38; see also U.S. Nat’l Archives & Rec. Admin., Sherman Antitrust
Act (1890), https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=51#.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
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conspiracy or combination to monopolize.”62 However, in Standard Oil v.
U.S., the Supreme Court narrowed the operation of the Sherman Act by
articulating the Rule of Reason test, which asks whether a given restraint’s
harm to competition outweighs its procompetitive effects, and thereafter,
prohibiting restraints of trade deemed too harmful to an industry.63
Many commentators argue the Sherman Act should apply to the NCAA
because, among other reasons, the NCAA is organized to maximize
revenues for its member-intuitions while it restricts student-athletes’
economic gain inside and outside of their roles as student-athletes.64 It is
ironic how closely analogous the NCAA is to the massive trusts that the
Sherman Act was created to dissolve—like those trusts, the NCAA is an
arrangement by several universities to transfer governance power of
collegiate sports from their individual universities to a single set of decision
makers, allowing those decision makers to dominate the collegiate sports
industry and stifle any potential competition. And at one point, it appeared
as though the NCAA was on the verge of receiving similar treatment as
those trusts. In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Supreme Court utilized the
Rule of Reason to hold that the NCAA’s television plan violated Section 1
of the Sherman Act because it constituted illegal per se price fixing of
television contracts, however, the Court declined to extend the protections
of the Sherman Act to student-athletes regulated by the NCAA.65 The Court
indicated that NCAA rules regarding amateurism, academic integrity, and
competitive fairness did not violate antitrust laws because, consistent with
the Sherman Act, the NCAA must have ample latitude to preserve a revered
tradition that might otherwise die, and their rules are already tailored to that
critical role.66 This ruling laid the groundwork for federal courts to reject
subsequent antitrust challenges to NCAA rules by granting unprecedented
deference to the NCAA.67 But the proverbial tide began to turn against the
NCAA when the district court in O’Bannon examined amateurism
principles under a more contemporary lens.68

62. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
63. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66–67 (1911).
64. See Matthew J. Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of” Big Time”
College Athletics: The Need to Shift from Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century Ideals of Amateurism
to the Economic Realities of the 21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 3 (2000); See also
Asim S. Raza, Should the NCAA’s Eligibility Rules Be Subjected to the Sherman Antitrust Act?, 4
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L.113, 123–24 (1993); Erin Cronk, Unlawful
Encroachment: Why the NCAA Must Compensate Student-Athletes for the Use of Their Names,
Images, And Likenesses, 34 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 135, 137 (2013).
65. Nat’l. Coll. Athletic Assn. v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101–02 (1984).
66. See id. at 120.
67. See Mitten, supra note 64, at 4.
68. See generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Assn., 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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NCAA

The O’Bannon lawsuit began after Ed O’Bannon, a former college
athlete, noticed an avatar in a video game that both physically resembled
him and wore a University of California Los Angeles basketball jersey with
the same number he wore when he played for the university.69 The lawsuit
was brought in 2009 as a class-action lawsuit comprising of then-current
and former college athlete plaintiffs challenging the NCAA’s rules
restricting compensation for elite men’s football and basketball players.70
The plaintiffs claimed that the set of rules barring student-athletes from
receiving a share of revenue from the NCAA for the sale of licenses to use
student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses in video games, live game
telecasts, and other footage constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade
that violated the Sherman Act. 71 The NCAA denied the allegations and
asserted that the challenged restrictions on student-athlete compensation
were reasonable as procompetitive justifications because they were
necessary to maintain the tradition of amateurism, maintain the competitive
balance among member-institutions, promote integration of academics and
athletics, and increase the total output of its product (i.e. sporting events).72
These were the same arguments the NCAA relied on in Board of Regents.73
In forming its opinion, the court first considered the Rule of Reason as
the presumptive standard under which it would decide whether the NCAA’s
rules and bylaws operated as an unreasonable restraint of trade, and
therefore, be in violation of the Sherman Act.74 The court explained that
“[a] restraint violates the rule of reason if the restraint’s harm to
competition outweighs its procompetitive effects.”75 In order to make that
determination, courts in the Ninth Circuit rely on a burden shifting
framework that begins with the plaintiff bearing the initial burden of
proving that the restraint poses “significant anticompetitive effects” within
a “relevant market.” 76 If this initial burden is satisfied, the burden then
shifts to the defendant to come forward with evidence of the restraint’s
procompetitive effects.77 Finally, if the defendant satisfies its burden, the
plaintiff must show that the legitimate procompetitive objectives outlined
by the defendant can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.78
Under this backdrop, the plaintiffs pointed to two relevant markets where
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See Sheetz, supra note 17 , at 866.
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 962–63.
Id. at 963.
Id. at 973.
See Steele, supra note 7, at 521.
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 985.
Id. at 985. (citing Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001)
(emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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they claimed the challenged restraint caused anticompetitive effects: (1) the
“college education market,” in which colleges and universities compete to
recruit student-athletes; and (2) the “group licensing market,” in which
media entities, like television networks and videogame developers, compete
for group licenses to use the NIL rights of student-athletes in their
commercialized content.79
In considering the market for college education, the court concluded
that colleges and universities are the only suppliers of the bundle of college
education and athletic opportunities in the relevant market.80 Additionally,
the court noted colleges and universities have exercised power, through the
NCAA and its conferences, to fix the price of their product by forming an
agreement to charge every prospective student-athlete the same price for the
bundle of educational and athletic opportunities they offer in exchange for
the student-athletes’ athletic services and rights while they are enrolled.81 If
a school sought to lower its price by offering further forms of
compensation, that school may be subject to sanctions by the NCAA.82 For
these reasons, the court held that this price-fixing agreement constituted a
restraint of trade. 83 The court pointed out that agreements among
universities not to offer student-athletes a share of their licensing revenue
indirectly eliminated a form of price competition.84 In past cases involving
anti-trust suits, the Supreme Court has held similar agreements to be
inherently unlawful.85
In its group licensing market analysis, the court identified three
submarkets for group licensing of student-athletes’ NIL rights: (1) live
game telecasts, (2) videogames, and (3) game re-broadcasts, highlight clips,
and other archival footage.86 The court discerned that student-athletes could
serve as hypothetical sellers of their NIL rights while media companies
could serve as hypothetical buyers in each potential market.87

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 986.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Assn., 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 990.
See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (holding that an
agreement among competing wholesalers to refuse to sell to a retailer unless the retailer made
payment in advance or upon delivery was a form of price fixing that lacked any potential
redeeming value and declared unlawful per se); see also Nat’l Soc’y of Prof. Eng’rs v. U.S., 435
U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (holding the society of engineers could not require its members to adhere to
a code of professional ethics that disallowed competitive bidding because it was an indirect form
of price-fixing which operated to restrain trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act); see also
Cont’l Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977) (noting that per se rules of
illegality on trade-restrictive practices are appropriate because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of redeeming virtue).
86. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Assn., 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
87. Id. at 994–99.
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With regards to the live game telecast submarket, the court found that
the plaintiffs failed to show that the NCAA’s rules would harm competition
because they could not show, even absent NCAA rules, any situation where
student-athletes would compete against each other to sell group licenses or
that buyers of group licenses might compete against each other.88 The court
reasoned that if a network or media company sought a group license for a
specific event, it would have to obtain a group license from each university
participating in that event.89 Furthermore, the court suggested that none of
the universities would compete against each other as sellers of group
licenses because each group license would have to be sold in order for any
single group to have value;90 since buyers already competed against each
other for these group licenses, allowing student-athletes to seek
compensation for group licenses would not increase the number of
television networks nor enhance competition in this submarket.91
The court used the same reasoning to conclude that the challenged rules
do not suppress competition in the videogame submarket.92 The fact that
every team or student-athlete would be included in the videogame infers
that competition is highly unlikely, and thus, unharmed. 93 Similarly,
because videogame developers would need to acquire group licenses from
all teams or a set of teams, those teams would not compete against each
other because they have a shared interest in ensuring the developer acquired
each group license required to create a marketable product.94
In considering the submarket for game re-broadcasts, highlight clips,
and other archival footage, the court recognized that the NCAA employed a
third-party agent to manage all licensing related to the submarket.95 Since
the third-party agent was expressly prohibited from licensing any footage
featuring then-current student-athletes and had to obtain permission from
former student-athletes, the court held no current or former student-athletes
were actually deprived of any compensation they would otherwise receive
in the absence of the challenged NCAA rules.96
Although the plaintiffs could not show the NCAA’s rules imposed a
restraint on competition in the overall group licensing market, they satisfied
their burden of showing that the NCAA’s rules imposed a restraint on
competition in the college education market. 97 As a result, the burden
shifted to the NCAA to assert procompetitive justifications for its rules
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 994–98.
Id. at 995.
Id.
Id. at 996.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Assn., 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
Id. at 997.
Id. at 998.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 999.
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barring student-athletes from receiving compensation for use of their NIL
rights. 98 The NCAA, as it did in Board of Regents, set forth four
procompetitive justifications: (1) the preservation of amateurism in college
sports; (2) promoting competitive balance among college sports teams; (3)
the integration of academics and athletics; and (4) the ability to generate
greater output in relevant markets.99
The court gave its greatest scrutiny to the “preservation of amateurism”
justification.100 The court pointed out that Board of Regents “does not stand
for the sweeping proposition that student-athletes must be barred, both
during their college years and forever thereafter, from receiving any
monetary compensation for the commercial use of their names, images, and
likenesses.”101 The court reexamined the Supreme Court’s suggestion that
in order to preserve the quality of the NCAA’s product, student-athletes
must not be paid.102 It reasoned that such a suggestion was not based on any
factual findings from the record and does not establish that the NCAA’s
current restraints are procompetitive or without less restrictive
alternatives.103 Additionally, the plaintiffs had shown that the college sports
industry has changed substantially in the thirty years since Board of Regents
was decided.104 Lastly, the court scrutinized the ambiguity of amateurism
by citing the historical practice of the NCAA to frequently revise its rules
governing student-athlete compensation, sometimes in contradiction to its
core set of principles.105
Although the court ultimately found the NCAA’s amateurism principles
were weak procompetitive justifications for restrictions on student-athlete
compensation, it did not go as far as to render amateurism a nonjustification. 106 It opined that “[a]lthough [NCAA rules] might justify a
restriction on large payments to student-athletes while in school, they do
not justify the rigid prohibition on compensating student-athletes, in the
present or in the future, with any share of licensing revenue generated from
the use of their names, images, and likenesses.” 107 From the court’s
perspective, the NCAA had provided sufficient evidence showing that by
preventing student-athletes from being paid large sums of money and
facilitating integration of student-athletes into academic communities, one

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

O’Bannon v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Assn., 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
Id.
Id. at 999–1002.
Id. at 999.
Id.
Id. at 999–1000.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Assn., 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 999–1000 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
Id. at 1000.
Id. at 1001.
Id.
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could infer that some NCAA restraints on student-athlete compensation
yielded procompetitive benefits.108
Since the NCAA met its burden under the Rule of Reason, the burden
made a final shift to the plaintiffs to show the existence of less restrictive
alternatives to the challenged restraint. 109 Plaintiffs identified two less
restrictive alternatives: (1) the NCAA could permit schools to award
stipends to student-athletes up to the full cost of attendance to make up for
any shortfall in its grants-in-aid, and (2) the NCAA could permit its schools
to hold limited and equal shares of its licensing revenue in trust to be
distributed to student-athletes after they leave college or after their athletic
eligibility expires.110 The court suggested the NCAA could prohibit schools
from funding stipends or payments held in trust with anything other than
revenue generated from the use of student-athletes’ NIL rights. 111
Furthermore, permitting schools to award these stipends would increase
price competition among schools in the college education market without
undermining the NCAA’s stated procompetitive objectives. 112 Lastly, the
court concluded that a narrowly-tailored trust payment system—allowing
schools to offer student-athletes a limited and equal share of licensing
revenue generated from student-athletes’ NIL rights—constituted a less
restrictive means of achieving the NCAA’s stated procompetitive goals.113
On appeal, a majority of the Ninth Circuit affirmed that NCAA
restrictions on student-athlete compensation are subject to antitrust scrutiny
and, therefore, must be tested under the Rule of Reason.114 Reapplying the
Rule of Reason, the appeals court affirmed the holding that compensation
rules have a significant anticompetitive effect on the college education
market and the NCAA’s rules serve two legitimate procompetitive purposes
identified by the district court, but the appeals court departed from the
reasoning of the district court when considering less restrictive
alternatives. 115 According to the appeals court, requiring the NCAA to
provide compensation up to the full cost of attendance, replacing the grantin-aid scholarship, was proper.116 However, the appeals court found that the
district court clearly erred in finding it a viable alternative to allow students
to receive NIL rights cash payments directly from universities untethered to
their academic expenses.117 The court explained that “in finding that paying
students cash compensation would promote amateurism as effectively as
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 1004.
Id.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Assn., 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
Id.
Id. at 1006.
Id. at 1006–07.
O’ Bannon v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Assn., 802 F.3d 1049, 1066 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1074–75.
Id. at 1076.
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not paying them, the district court ignored that not paying student-athletes
is precisely what makes them amateurs.” 118 Following this ruling, each
party’s request for appeal was denied by the Supreme Court, thereby giving
full effect to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.119
III STATE LE ISLATI E SOLUTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION
A CALIFORNIA S FAIR PAY TO PLAY
California has earned the distinguished label of leading all states in the
movement to protect student-athletes from both health-related and financialrelated injuries. Aside from federal courts in California hosting several
landmark legal challenges to NCAA rules, 120 the California State
Legislature has passed state laws designed to protect student-athletes. In
2012, California passed the “Student-Athletes Bill of Rights,” 121 which
forced universities to pay insurance premiums for low-income athletes,
cover medical expenses for student-athletes up to two years after they
exhaust their eligibility, and, if the student-athlete suffers an incapacitating
injury, provide a scholarship for up to five academic years or until the
student-athlete completes their degree.122
In September 2019, California passed SB 206, publicly known as the
Fair Pay to Play Act.123 The text of the Act aims squarely at the NCAA’s
economic restrictions on student-athlete compensation. 124 The Act’s
purpose is to “develop policies to ensure appropriate protections are in
place to avoid exploitation of student-athletes, colleges, and universities.”125
Generally, it prohibits California’s postsecondary educational institutions
(except community colleges), athletic associations, conferences, or
organizations with authority over intercollegiate athletics, from disciplining
student-athletes who license their NIL rights or obtain professional
representation relating to their participation in intercollegiate athletics.126
Alternatively, the Act prohibits athletic associations, conferences, or
organizations with authority over intercollegiate athletics from restricting
118. Id.
119. See Nat’l Coll. Athletic Assn. v. O’Bannon, No. 15-1388, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 5140, at *1
(U.S., Oct. 3, 2016); O’Bannon v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Assn., No. 15-1167, 2016 U.S. LEXIS
5164, at *1 (U.S., Oct. 3, 2016).
120. See supra, Part II.
121. See S.B. 206, Cal. State Assemb., 2019-20 Sess. (Cal. 2019), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.
gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB206.
122. See Dennis Dodd, California passes Student-Athlete Bill of Rights, CBS SPORTS (Oct. 9,
2012, 5:18 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/california-passes-studentathlete-bill-of-rights/.
123. See S.B. 206, Cal. State Assemb., 2019-20 Sess. (Cal. 2019), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.
gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB206.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
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postsecondary educational institutions’ (other than a community college)
participation in intercollegiate athletics as a result of one of their studentathletes receiving compensation for the use of their NIL rights.127 It also
prohibits revocation of a student’s scholarship as a result of earning such
compensation.128 Furthermore, it prohibits postsecondary institutions from
restricting compensation to prospective student-athletes relating to their
NIL rights. 129 Notably, the Act permits student-athletes access to a
professional representative, licensed by the State of California, to assist
them in contracting or other legal matters.130 In sum, the law purports to
protect both student-athletes and its California-based member-institutions
from NCAA bylaws restricting compensation related to the use of NIL
rights.
Although these rules appear on their face to accomplish the goal of
providing student-athletes access to their NIL rights, the Act’s text is overly
broad and ambiguous, which may lead to unnecessary confusion when
enforcing it. 131 For instance, one rule prohibits a student-athlete from
entering into a contract providing compensation for use of their NIL rights
if a provision of that contract is in conflict with a provision of the studentathlete’s team contract.132 But a separate rule prohibits a team contract from
preventing a student-athlete from using their NIL rights for commercial
purposes when they are not engaged in official team activities, as specified
by the rule. 133 These rules could create conflicts of interest for studentathletes trying to sign endorsement deals, leaving such deals susceptible to
being voided.134 If, for example, a student-athlete went to a school that had
a preexisting contract with Nike, they wouldn’t then be able to sign an
individual endorsement deal with Adidas, as that deal would likely conflict
with the school’s contract with Nike.135 Consequently, these rules severely
restrict a player’s freedom of movement to do what they wish with their
own NIL rights.136
Student-athletes, many of whom are minors when they first enroll at
NCAA member-institutions, should not have their freedom to contract
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Jess Mixon, Future of student-athlete compensation remains uncertain after California
bill, DAILY PA. (Oct. 14, 2019, 7:05 PM), https://www.thedp.com/article/2019/10/pennsylvaniacollege-athletes-compensation-law-california-robin-harris.
132. See S.B. 206, Cal. State Assemb., 2019-20 Sess. (Cal. 2019), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.
gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB206.
133. See id.
134. See Andrew Rossow, Will California’s ‘Fair Pay to Play Act’ Bring Legal Problems for
NCAA Athletes?, GRIT DAILY (Oct. 1, 2019), https://gritdaily.com/california-signs-fair-pay-toplay-act-defying-ncaa/.
135. See id.
136. See id.
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heavily restricted during one of the most economically opportunistic
periods of their lives.137 The freedom to contract is a fundamental right that
requires additional legal protections, especially when limitations are sought
to be imposed based on status (i.e., as a student-athlete) rather than capacity
or subject matter of the contract.138 Therefore, a plan must be conceived to
implement robust legal protections for student-athletes seeking cash
compensation in exchange for the right to license their NIL rights.
IMPLEMENTATION STRATE Y
The implementation of legal protections concerning student-athletes’
NIL rights should be consistent with suggestions made by the appellate
court in O’Bannon, which held that the NCAA is subject to anti-trust
scrutiny and its policies must be tested under the Rule of Reason.139 The
O’Bannon ruling requires the NCAA to provide student-athletes with grants
equal to the cost of attendance, but nothing more. 140 Consequently,
universities should not be involved with the process of implementing NIL
rights, nor should they participate in compensating student-athletes
monetarily. Not paying student-athletes in cash would allow universities to
maintain some semblance of amateurism,141 while directly paying studentathletes may exacerbate the NCAA’s concerns about competitiveness in
collegiate sports142 and be closer to the troubling notion that college sports
would morph into professional sports. 143 Although the Ninth Circuit
recognized these considerations, the court did not go so far as to say that it
would be improper to permit student-athletes to license their own NIL
rights for profit.144 Therefore, a law that permits student-athletes to profit
from their individual NIL rights, accompanied by reasonable limitations to
how these rights may be used and mechanisms for receiving profits, is a
viable solution.
One way to afford student-athletes access to their NIL rights is for
legislatures to enact laws expressly granting student-athletes in public
universities the right to use their own name, image, or likeness for profit
without eligibility or participation repercussions from the university for
137. See supra, Part I (B).
138. See David P. Weber, Restricting the Freedom of Contract: A Fundamental Prohibition, 16
YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J. 51, 54 (2013).
139. O’ Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015).
140. Id.
141. See supra, Part I (B).
142. Members of the NCAA Board of Governors, NCAA responds to California Senate Bill
206, NCAA (Sept. 11, 2019, 10:08 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/news/ncaa-responds-california-senate-bill-206.
143. See Michael McCann, What’s Next After California Signs Game Changer Fair Pay to Play
Act Into Law?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/09/
30/fair-pay-to-play-act-law-ncaa-california-pac-12.
144. See generally O’ Bannon v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Assn., 802 F.3d 1049, 1066 (9th Cir.
2015).
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whom they play provided that they do not infringe on the publicity rights of
the university. In a Forbes article discussing the language that the NCAA
could add to their bylaws, Professor Marc Edelman of Baruch College laid
out a provision that would accomplish such a task:
Permissible Student-Athlete Licensing Rights. A payment administered by
a non-educational institution is not considered to be pay or the promise of
pay for athletics skill, provided the student-athlete does not use the
trademarks of the NCAA or any NCAA member college in any manner
that may be construed as an endorsement, unless such manner is otherwise
protected by principles of the First Amendment or fair use.145

The language in Professor Edelman’s proposed NCAA rule addresses
the concern that permitting student-athletes unrestricted access to their NIL
rights may give rise to contractual conflicts with the endorsement deals that
NCAA member-institutions have on their own. 146 As Professor Edelman
points out, this rule would also assuage any concerns about student-athletes
using member-institutions’ trademarks in conjunction with their studentathlete endorsement deals that might imply a false relationship between the
NCAA or a member-institution with any particular brand or product, 147
which is not entirely clear under California’s Fair Pay to Play Act.148 This
rule would essentially serve as a carve-out to NCAA bylaws; one that does
not conflict with other NCAA restrictions on compensation.149
The language of Professor Edelman’s proposed rule should be utilized
by state legislatures (and ideally federal) in proposed legislation then signed
into law. By using this or similar language, payment by a third party’s use
of a student-athlete’s NIL rights would not be construed as pay for athletic
skill, which is currently prohibited by NCAA bylaws.150 Additionally, this
language includes a caveat to student-athletes licensing rights, indicating
that the student-athletes’ right to endorse products or services would not
grant them any rights to infringe upon existing trademarks. 151 The
simplicity and narrowness of this language will reduce confusion amongst
145. Marc Edelman, NCAA Can’t Figure Out How To Grant Student-Athletes Endorsement
Rights, But It’s Simple – Really, FORBES (May 10, 2018, 10:17 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/marcedelman/2018/05/10/the-ncaa-cant-figure-out-how-to-grant-student-athleteendorsement-rights-so-i-will-help-them/#75e81efe2c01.
146. See Thomas Baker, 5 Issues To Keep An Eye On With The NCAA’s New NIL Policy,
FORBES (Nov. 1, 2019, 11:40 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbaker/2019/11/01/
examining-the-ncaas-evolving-nil-policy-keep-an-eye-on-the-following-issues/#5e41f4d97591
(describing how California’s new law includes the limitation that athletes can’t endorse brands
that compete with school sponsorships).
147. See Edelman, supra note 145.
148. See generally S.B. 206, Cal. State Assemb., 2019-20 Sess. (Cal. 2019),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB206.
149. See Edelman, supra note 145.
150. See generally NCAA, 2019-2020 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 1, 234 (2019),
https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/reports/getReport/90008.
151. See Edelman, supra note 145.
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courts interpreting these and limit courts who seek to broaden
interpretations of acceptable uses of student-athlete NIL rights that may be
inconsistent with the intent of the legislature.152
Critics may argue that any laws containing such language would unduly
interfere with interstate commerce and should be deemed unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause, or its corollary, the Dormant Commerce
Clause.153 They may argue that, since the NCAA broadcasts games across
state lines, sell and ship merchandise across state lines, and coordinates
games across state lines, such a law could plausibly lead to interference
with interstate commerce.154 Indeed, the NCAA won a similar argument in
NCAA v. Miller, where Judge Ferdinand Fernandez of the Ninth Circuit
held that the Commerce Clause barred the State of Nevada from requiring
the NCAA to provide it certain procedural due process protections during a
sanctions enforcement proceeding.155 Judge Fernandez expressed concerns
that the NCAA would be required to adopt the rules of Nevada for every
state in order for the rule to apply equally; there was also the possibility
other states might adopt different requirements.156
Nevertheless, in defending itself from probable future litigation,
California (or any legislature that enacts this type of legislation) should
indicate that these laws are distinguishable from the outlawed Nevada
statute because they do not concern the NCAA’s ability to punish
institutions for misconduct, it merely pertains to the relationship between
college athletes and third parties.157 Any future litigation must also consider
the court’s rationale in O’Bannon and current public policy considerations
regarding any compensation for student-athletes. A court considering these
issues in the future should, like the court in O’Bannon, come to the
conclusion that the modernization and commercialization of college sports
requires reevaluation in how courts analyze rules with economic restrictions
on student-athletes’ individual NIL rights.158
Some may opine that it would be much more efficient and realistic for
the NCAA itself to adopt such language to their bylaws.159 In fact, soon
after the commencement of drafting this Note, the NCAA announced that
their top decision makers voted to allow college athletes to profit from their
names, images and likenesses “in a manner consistent with the collegiate

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See supra, Part II (B).
See McCann, supra note 143.
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model.”160 The spokesperson for the working group, Gene Smith (Athletic
Director at Ohio State University), indicated that the new rules would not
follow the “California model” of an unrestricted market, but that the
working group would remain involved in sorting out the details of how to
implement new rules and the NCAA would likely stay involved as the
group in charge of regulating future endorsement deals.161
However, herein lies another example of the NCAA kicking the tires
while also attempting to keep itself involved in these issues. As the NCAA
has indicated in the past, they have not been keen on amending their bylaws
in this way,162 nor should legislatures hold their breath waiting for them to
do so. This announcement came from a working group that has been
focused on these issues since May 2019,163 and still the NCAA has yet to
come up with a practical model conveying new rights of publicity rules for
student-athletes or how to implement them. Nor has the NCAA detailed
what “in a manner consistent with the collegiate model” would look like.
As noted above, the NCAA should not be involved in an implementation
process in any capacity because there are blatant conflicts of interest for a
working group that has ties to the NCAA. 164 Therefore, in addition to
codifying the language above, legislatures should also adopt provisions
laying out a comprehensive implementation plan that describes how
student-athletes may exercise newfound NIL rights, i.e., how studentathletes can license their NIL rights and when or how they may receive
profits from deals they make.
Legal scholars and legislatures have suggested one of the first steps in
implementing such a solution would be to permit student-athletes the use of
a professional representative to assist them in exploring any licensing,
marketing, or endorsement deals. 165 Tye Gonser, one of the founding
160. Dan Murphy, NCAA clears way for athletes to profit from names, images and likenesses,
ESPN (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/27957981/ncaa-clears-wayathletes-profit-names-images-likenesses.
161. Id.
162. In this article, U.S. Congressman Mark Walker is quoted as saying, “. . . [w]hile their
words are promising they have used words in the past to deny equity and basic constitutional
rights for student-athletes.” See id.
163. See Garrett Stepien, Ohio State AD Gene Smith comments on NCAA likeness vote, 247
SPORTS (Oct. 29, 4:25 PM), https://247sports.com/college/ohio-state/Article/Ohio-StateBuckeyes-Gene-Smith-student-athlete-name-image-likeness-law-NCAA-vote-Fair-Pay-to-PlayAct-137708836/.
164. Gene Smith is part of the working group while also being the Athletic Director at the Ohio
State University. Like others in the working group with ties to the NCAA, he has an incentive to
look out for the best interests of the NCAA, not student-athletes. See Georgia Stoia, ‘The NCAA
will implode’: OU professor, expert in intercollegiate athletics weighs in on NCAA’s pay-for-play
ruling and how it will affect Oklahoma athletics, OU DAILY (Oct. 31, 2019),
http://www.oudaily.com/sports/the-ncaa-will-implode-ou-professor-expert-in-intercollegiateathletics/article_1cbb81d8-fc36-11e9-8803-2f7072b8ff1e.html.
165. See John Meghamez, An All-Encompassing Primer on Student-Athlete Name, Image, and
Likeness Rights and How O’Cannon v. NCAA and Keller v. NCAA Forever Changed College
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partners of Weinberg Gonser, LLP and owner of website
Fairplay4ncaa.com, developed a three-step solution called “The Plan” that
bills itself as a “practical plan providing monetization and amateurism for
the Student-Athlete.”166 Gonser’s plan suggests that: (1) all student-athletes
assign their NIL rights to an independent third party, the Clearinghouse,
who would serve as a professional representative; (2) the Clearinghouse
would then negotiate both individual and group deals on behalf of all
student-athletes; and finally, (3) the Clearinghouse would distribute funds
upon graduation of the athlete, with a percentage disbursed from group
deals, a percentage disbursed from individual deals, and a percentage
disbursed to the community.167
Assigning student-athletes’ NIL rights to an independent third party is
one possibility, however, as in California’s Fair Pay to Play Act, it would
be more beneficial for student-athletes to be represented by members of the
legal profession who are able to handle many different matters for them.168
Student-athletes are typically minors who should not be expected to be able
to effectively manage business issues that arise upon licensing one’s NIL
rights. Moreover, their priorities should be largely focused towards
education and athletics. 169 Legal counsel can not only aid in navigating
contractual and legal matters, but can also be charged with directing
student-athletes in other matters, such as personal finance management,
investment management, insurance, and important tax consequences. 170
Legal counsel would be effective in combatting the concern that studentathletes may be further exploited171 because lawyers are held to high ethical
and moral standards employed by the state bar they are associated to,172 as
opposed to third parties who may not be subject to the same standards. But
even still, because of the sensitivity of these issues, such representatives
should be further subjected to a separate, carefully formulated code of
conduct which aims to prevent potential abuses and offset concerns
Athletics, 9 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 313, 367 (2015); Yishun Wang M.A., Student-Athletes’ Right of
Publicity Legal Issue and Implications, A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the University
of Minnesota (May 2016), https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/181683/Wang_
umn_0130E_17171.pdf?sequence=1; See also S.B. 206, Cal. State Assemb., 2019-20 Sess. (Cal.
2019), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB206.
166. See Tye Gonser, Intro, FP4NCAA (2017), https://www.fairplay4ncaa.com.
167. See Tye Gonser, The Program, FP4NCAA (2017), https://www.fairplay4ncaa.com.
168. See Wang, supra note 165.
169. See David A. Grenardo, The Duke Model: A Performance-Based Solution for
Compensating College Athletes, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 157, 203 (2018).
170. Katie Davis, How Taxes Could Disrupt the Gameplan of Paying Student-Athletes, JAMES
MOORE, https://www.jmco.com/student-athlete-tax-issues (last visited Nov. 22, 2019).
171. See Dalton Thacker, Amateurism vs. Capitalism: A Practical Approach to Paying College
Athletes, 16 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 183, 191–93 (2017).
172. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Preamble & Scope, ABA,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_pro
fessional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preamble_scope/ (last visited Nov. 22,
2019).
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regarding student-athletes taking side payments from boosters or being
unduly influenced by bad actors.173
Assigning NIL rights to a third party to negotiate on behalf of all
student-athletes raises questions as to how revenue will be distributed,
especially once one considers what each parties’ equitable contribution may
be to earning those funds.174 This is almost an impossible calculation unless
revenue generation is considered. But, in assessing individual NIL rights,
revenue generation from each sport is irrelevant to calculating the value of
such rights,175 and attempting to conjure valuations could get particularly
messy.176 Additionally, assigning those rights to the NCAA runs the risk of
creating an agency relationship, which the NCAA has taken exhaustive
steps to avoid.177 Therefore, it is in the best interests of student-athletes, in
the current environment, to forego this route and focus primarily on
profiting from their individual NIL rights until the NCAA modernizes their
total compensation rules.178
In order to preserve principles of amateurism and allow student-athletes
to profit from their NIL rights, several legal scholars agree that it makes
sense to hold any profits student-athletes earn in a legal trust fund,
distributed during their career only to cover day-to-day expenses, and in full
after their career as a student-athlete is complete.179 The appeals court in
O’Bannon rejected the concept of a trust fund financed through universities
in the form of shared royalties from revenues generated by student-athletes’
NIL rights, however, the court did not opine on trust funds financed by
student-athletes’ individual NIL rights revenue, which may resolve the
underlying concern with the initial concept. 180 Similar to the manner by
which the International Olympics Committee has created trust funds for its
own athletes, these trusts should be funded mainly by collecting money
earned from individual student-athletes’ NIL rights deals.181 The purpose of
such a trust would be to cover the expenses of attending college that are not
covered by scholarships a student-athlete has received, be it from the
173. See Lathrop, supra note 40.
174. See Chaz Gross, Modifying Amateurism: A Performance-Based Solution to Compensating
Student–Athletes for Licensing Their Names, Images, and Likenesses, 16 CHICAGO-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 259, 284 (2017).
175. See Matt Savare, The Price of Celebrity: Valuing the Right of Publicity in Calculating
Compensatory Damages, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 129, 162-64 (2004).
176. See id. at 150–60.
177. See Meghamez, supra note 165, at 370 n. 412.
178. See Thomas Barrabi, NCAA votes to let student athletes profit from their names, images,
FOX BUS., https://www.foxbusiness.com/fox-business/ncaa-votes-to-let-student-athletes-profitfrom-their-names-images (last visited Nov. 22, 2019).
179. See Meghamez, supra note 165, at 370 n. 412; see also Kristine Mueller, No Control Over
their Rights of Publicity: College Athletes Left Sitting the Bench, 2 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 70, 87 (2004); Vladimir P. Belo, The Shirts Off Their Backs: Colleges Getting
Away with Violating the Right of Publicity, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 133, 154 (1996).
180. See generally O’ Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
181. Belo, supra note 179, at 154.
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institution or otherwise.182 When the student-athlete graduates or leaves the
institution for professional sports or another career, termination of the trust
would be triggered and the residue (the remaining funds) of the trust
distributed to that individual student-athlete.183 Some have suggested that
the release of such funds should be conditioned on graduation and
performance metrics,184 but these funds would not be tied to the memberinstitution nor directly relate to education, and therefore should not have
education-related performance requirements conditioned for their release.
The trust fund solution is a fair solution because it maintains features of
amateurism that the NCAA seeks to maintain.185 It permits athletes to reap
the financial benefits of their NIL rights while helping keep the spotlight off
those benefits and instead on what is more important: education and
amateur athletics.186 Furthermore, it will provide necessary funding to the
many student-athletes who come from poverty, 187 some of whom cannot
even afford to pay for cafeteria meals during sports season.188 Also, because
most student-athletes will never go on to fulfill a lucrative professional
career,189 many will still be permitted to realize their publicity value during
their limited window of opportunity as a student-athlete.190
Ultimately, the intention of this two-part solution, the suggested
legislation and implementation of these rights, is to balance notions of
fairness amongst student-athletes and the NCAA. Unfortunately, as it
stands, the NCAA and its system of governance is inherently unfair. 191
There are multiple divisions within the NCAA, comprised of schools of all
shapes and sizes, that offer different types of sports and generate differing
levels of revenues. 192 If the NCAA were forced into sharing royalty
payments with student-athletes, it could invoke other regulatory
considerations, like Title IX, that would require the NCAA to figure out fair
economic treatment of athletes from smaller schools and different
genders.193 Although this would be great progress for all student-athletes,
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 154–55.
Id.
See generally Gross, supra note 174.
Mueller, supra note 179, at 87–88.
Id.
See Thacker, supra note 171, at 190 (describing the stories of many athletes who come
from poverty and do not have the money to pay their school expenses).
188. See Roger Sherman, Shabazz Napier: ‘There’s hungry nights where I’m not able to eat’,
S.B. NATION (Apr. 7, 2014), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2014/4/7/5591774/
shabazz-napier-uconn-basketball-hungry-nights.
189. See Zak Cheney-Rice, Here’s What Happens to the 98% of College Athletes Who Don’t
Go Pro, MIC (Mar. 19, 2014), https://www.mic.com/articles/85789/here-s-what-happens-to-the98-of-college-athletes-who-don-t-go-pro.
190. Vladimir P. Belo, The Shirts Off Their Backs: Colleges Getting Away with Violating the
Right of Publicity, 19 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L. J. 133, 156 (1996).
191. See Thacker, supra note 171, at 201.
192. See id.
193. See id.
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such action may serve to dilute the potential value of financial awards to
student-athletes and increase the risk of universities cutting their athletic
programs entirely due to increased costs; in other words, the risk may not
be worth the reward. 194 This solution offers fair consideration of the
NCAA’s desire to maintain features of amateurism while also recognizing
that student-athletes should have the right to profit from their own NIL
rights, just like any other student of higher learning.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the absence of relief under federal antitrust law calls for a new
strategy in providing legal relief to student-athletes who continue to be
economically oppressed by the NCAA: protecting student-athletes’ NIL
rights. After decades of federal courts’ reluctance to apply the Sherman Act
to the NCAA’s restrictions on student-athlete compensation, it is up to the
individual states or Congress to draw up legislation permitting studentathletes the use of their NIL rights. Legislatures must expressly grant
student-athletes in public universities the right to use their own name,
image, or likeness for profit without eligibility or participation
repercussions from the university for whom they play, provided that they do
not infringe on the publicity rights of the university itself. Additionally,
legislatures should adopt provisions that detail the mechanisms of
exercising these rights, including student-athlete use of licensed legal
representatives and utilizing trust funds.
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